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Introduction 
Why is it necessary to understand the business risk of vulnerabilities? 
Within the field of information security we perform many audits and 
assessments, discovering all kinds of vulnerabilities. Vulnerabilities are 
often stated in rather technical language, and so the manager may not 
be able to recognize the problems. It also appears that discovered 
vulnerabilities are usually rated as high which means that the 
organisation needs to invest its scarce resources to mitigate all 
vulnerabilities. We need some measure to distinguish between 
vulnerabilities. Business risk is a commonly used measure to triage 
unwanted events within an organisation. 
 
Software vulnerabilities 
Today the security of software is a topic that has the attention of 
organisations and regulators. Managers ask for a penetration test to 
provide evidence about the security of their applications. If the resulting 
report states a couple of vulnerabilities that are rated as “high risk”, the 
manager asks, “What does it really mean for me? Do I have a severe 
issue?” This situation is encountered in day-to-day practice. Software 
vulnerabilities are stated in rather technical language, and the manager 
may not be able to recognize the problem. Even as an Information Risk 
Manager, it is often rather difficult to present the business risk. Vulnerabilities that are seen as a 
significant problem to the penetration testers can be difficult or impossible to relate to business 
(process) risks. 
 
Aim 
This article presents the results of an investigation of literature and the development of a method 
that management can use to understand and prioritise software vulnerabilities. 
 
Before we are able to judge how severe a vulnerability is, we must closely inspect the environment 
in which the vulnerability is found. We must: 
1. Understand where the system belongs to: what the greater context is. 
2. Understand what the system does: what the elements and functions are. 
3. Understand how the system acts: the data and control flow of the (sub)system.  
 
 
                                            
1 This article is to be published online by Computer Weekly as part of the 2015 Royal Holloway info security 
thesis series.  The full MSc thesis is published on the ISG’s website. 
 
A business risk is a 
Threat event occurring 
that exploits a 
Vulnerability causing 
an Impact on the 
organisation’s 
operation, assets or 
individuals. 
A software 
vulnerability is a 
weakness in the code 
of an information 
system, that could be 
exploited by a threat 
source 
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Probability of a threat  
From the definition of business risk, we know that before 
we can explain the risk to a manager, we need to know 
the vulnerability that is likely to occur and need to know 
what the impact of this occurrence is, using the risk 
language that he will understand. 
 
The likelihood of occurrence of the threat that will exploit the vulnerability can be assessed using the 
following model: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Threat Components and their relation 
 
In day-to-day practice, most reports will only describe some of the threat agents that exist (if any). 
Some reports present threats to the level of access, but the level of inhibitors and amplifiers are 
rarely mentioned. To be able to include these factors, one must understand the environment of the 
vulnerability – the threat combination. 
 
Source of risk model 
From a broad range of methods and frameworks that address the relationship between IT risk and 
business risk/objectives, concepts linking IT risks to risks relevant for management were assessed. 
This led to four sources of risks or impacts that are relevant for evaluating software: 
1. Operational risk related to business processes 
2. Regulatory risk effects of non-compliance with the applicable laws and regulations 
3. Reputational risk related to the brand of the organization 
4. IT generic risk stemming from the non-compliance of software with technical standards that 
leads to reduction of the overall information security 
  
Natural threat agent Fire, flood, power failures, and 
other. 
Unintentional 
threat agents 
Parties that cause damage or loss of 
service without direct intent. 
Intentional threat 
agents 
Those parties that would knowingly 
seek to make a threat manifest 
Capability Capability to conduct and sustain an 
attack or totally destroy the system 
and any replacement  
Threat catalyst Those factors or actions that cause 
an attack to be initiated at the time 
and on the target selected. 
Threat agent 
motivators 
Factors and influences that 
motivate a threat agent. 
Threat inhibitors Any factor that decreases either the 
likelihood of an attack taking place 
or being successful 
Threat amplifiers 
 
Any factor that increases either the 
likelihood of an attack taking place 
or being successful 
A threat is any circumstance or event 
with the potential to adversely impact 
organizational operations and assets, 
individuals, or other organizations. 
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Figure 2 provides an overview of the above mentioned different contexts that will affect the 
evaluation of software security. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Sources of risk model 
 
 
A model to link software vulnerabilities to business risks  
Based on a review of the literature and practical knowledge, a model was developed to link software 
vulnerabilities to business risk. It consists of four parts:  
1. The Environment in which the software vulnerability is discovered should be thoroughly 
understood.  
2. A Threat Score Model is developed to assess the likelihood of a threat exploiting the 
software vulnerability.  
3. The Impact of an Exploited Vulnerability must be assessed. This will be performed with the 
Information Risk Analysis Methodology (IRAM) of the Information Security Forum (ISF) to 
relate software vulnerabilities to the first three sources of risk. COBIT5 is selected to relate 
software risk to the fourth of the above sources of risk: the generic IT risk. 
4. The Resulting Risk for the broad business environment should be established and plotted in 
a 5x5 matrix. This will reveal the business risk and can be used during discussions to achieve 
mutual understanding about the risk. 
To illustrate this model a case study of four hypothetical software vulnerabilities within a 
hypothetical environment is presented next and the software vulnerabilities are thereby related to 
business risks. 
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1 Environment 
The environment of a hypothetical insurance organization is illustrated in the picture below. The 
following components are shown: 
 A wider environment that, for example, will impose legislation that will force the 
organization to change the retirement age from 65 to 67. 
 A business environment that influences how software risks are perceived. For example, 
within an insurance organization, people tend to be driven to ensure that there is no risk. 
Also, cultural goals such as “we do what we promise”. 
 A process with goals that will execute a certain activity for the organization to contribute to 
the organizational goals. For example, the insurance process will process an inquiry of a 
customer for a pension policy to ultimately yield the payment of the pension.  
 An application system that will support a (sub)process to attain its goals. In the example 
below, the policy administration system has the same scope as the process. The goals for the 
system will be equal to the process.  
 Application subsystems that will perform particular tasks within the whole application 
domain. For example, the goal of a calculation subsystem might be to calculate the premium 
of a customer accurately and on time. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Example environment  
 
The case study presents four kinds of hypothetical software vulnerabilities, discovered 
during a software penetration test: 
1. The software of the premium subsystem includes a bug that opens a back door 
to enable an attacker to change the beneficiary of the payment of a pension. 
2. An externally-hosted website includes a software flaw and makes it vulnerable 
for injection of pictures that compromise the organization. 
3. Due to a software bug, the SQL statement to retrieve customer privacy data 
can be misused to get a dump of all of the customer data within the system. 
4. The software is developed in such a way that it requires a particular port within 
the firewall to be opened in order to function properly. 
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2 Threat Score Model 
For the four hypothetical software vulnerabilities the proposed model below is filled in. With the 
results of the model the assessor and the business manager can discuss whether they agree with the 
estimates made and thus with the overall threat level. 
  
Figure 4: Case study: Threat Score Model  
 
Based on outcomes of the examples in the model, we can draw some conclusions. Changes in the 
circumstances can have a huge impact, such as in the first example. Previously, the vulnerability 
could not be exploited because the developer was not able to access production systems. The threat 
catalyst (i.e. that the developer gains access to the production environment to solve a production 
problem) changes that situation, and now he is able to exploit the vulnerability. Although, this 
vulnerability appears very severe, the threat inhibitor that the change of the beneficiary will be 
discovered in the payment system, makes it useless to exploit. This, however, requires that one has 
knowledge of the broad environment of the software to be able to assess the threat on its real 
merits. 
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Natural threat agent 0-4 N/A N/A N/A N/A
Unintentional threat 
agents
0-4 N/A N/A N/A N/A
Intentional threat 
agents
0-4 Disaffected employee. 4 Hackers or pressure 
groups.
3 Hackers or 
unauthorised staff.
3 Hackers. 4
4 3 3 4
Capability 0-4 Staff with no 
development 
knowledge is not able 
to understand what 
needs to be 
performed. 
Developer has no 
access to the 
production 
environement.
0 Software, technology, 
facilities, education 
and training, methods 
and books and 
manuals are easy to 
retrieve.
4 Hacker have the 
knowlegde to perform 
the attack. 
Normal users will be 
less knowledgable.
2 Hackers have the 
technology and the 
knowledge to perform 
port scans to search 
for vulnerabilities.
4
4 7 5 8
Threat catalyst 0-4 Developer get access 
rights for production 
environment to solve a 
production issue.
4 Dispute about a policy 
hold with the insurance 
company owning the 
website.
2 N/A 0 Technology change 
can effect that a port 
that was e.g. open for 
an application is now 
widely open.
2
8 9 5 10
Threat agent 
motivators
0-4 Personal gain. 4 Try to get even. 3 Power for the hacker.
Curiosity for the 
normal user.
3 Power to be able to 
hack the environment.
3
12 12 8 13
Threat inhibitors 0-16 Deveoper will lose his 
job.
Change will be 
discovered in 
payment system
10 Fear to get captured 
by police force.
4 Viewing of information 
is hardly monitored 
nowadays.
0 The use of the ports 
can be monitored and 
the hacker can be 
noticed.
2
2 8 8 11
Threat amplifiers 0-16 N/A 0 Target vulnerabilities, 
script available to 
execute it.
2 Access to information 
is a strong amplifier.
2 A server within a big 
Insurance firm could 
be a target to be 
proud of.
2
2 10 10 13
Threat score model
C = B + Catalyst
Access: D = C + 
E = D - inhibitors
Overall rating threat 
A = highest of three agents
B = score agent + 
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3 Impact of an exploited vulnerability 
Based on the results of the threat assessment, only the impact of the threats of examples 2, 3 and 4 
needs to be assessed. However, for illustration purposes, we will assume that Threat 1 will also be 
likely to occur. 
Bug in the software of the premium subsystem  
 
 
 
 
 
 
The impact of this vulnerability is related to the business process, so we need to relate the 
discovered vulnerability back to the impact on the business process. At this point, we need to use 
information about how the software acts, what the system does, and understand the environment 
of the system. We will use the following environment (Fig. 5): 
 
 
Figure 5: Relation process and application  
 
Information about how the software acts should normally be collected during the software security 
assessment phase. The Data Flow Diagram in which the flow of information is drawn can provide 
knowledge about the impact of the vulnerability on how the software acts. 
 
 
It is necessary to know what the system does in order to know why it is important that the piece of 
software that contains the vulnerability works in the intended manner. What are the relations 
between the subsystems? What are the input and output relations? 
 
Changes in beneficiaries are entered by staff of the policy administration department 
via an input screen of the beneficiary subsystem. The access to this functionality is 
restricted to several employees. The changes will only be validated if the changes are 
approved by another staff member (4-eyes check). 
However, by including a backdoor in the software of the beneficiary a fraudulent user 
is able to retrieve a shell and enter beneficiary data without the proper authorization 
and without the 4–eyes check. 
 
In our system, the Settlement subsystem uses the information of the Calculation 
subsystem and the Beneficiary subsystem as input. When the input from the Beneficiary 
subsystem is incorrect, the settlement can then be drafted for the wrong beneficiary. 
Definition of the example vulnerability: 
The software of the premium subsystem includes a 
bug that opens a back door to enable an attacker to 
change the beneficiary of the payment of a pension. 
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“To which environment does the system belong?” is the latest important question at system level. 
The system can receive input from other systems and provide output to other systems. It is also 
possible that the system will be supervised by a monitoring system. This can involve monitoring of 
the process flow through the system or monitoring that is more security-related (e.g. determining 
that there are no direct changes at the database level). 
 
It is important to know the Business context relevant for the discovered bug in order to gain insight 
into the business impact of the vulnerability. It is also important to know which process (part) the 
system supports. The process will have control objectives that need to be supported by the software 
if portions of the process are automated. 
 
A business manager of the process to which the control objective is related is able to assess the 
impact of an event that occurs. This assessment should be performed without taking into account 
the measures that have already been completed in this process (step) or in another process (step). 
Ultimately, the question would be what the impact is when the vulnerability materializes. 
When a Business Impact Assessment (BIA) is performed for the application of the process, a link with 
this assessment can be made to rate the impact of a vulnerability. 
 
 
 Figure 6: Case study: IRAM, F1 and F2 part of BIA sheet. 
 
 
The Policy Administration system has a user interface for, e.g., input of Beneficiary 
information. Settlements will be transferred to the Payment system, which will distribute 
the pensions to the customers. 
In the hypothetical environment, the Policy Administration system supports the Policy 
Administration process. One of the controls defined for the process is that a Beneficiary 
may only be changed by an authorized person and must be approved by a second 
authorized person. 
When a fraudulent person can change the beneficiary the impact should be assessed. This can, 
for example, be  related to the maximum amount of a settlement or a settlement run (e.g. the 
business-related fraudulent payments have a “high” impact rating – see Figure 6: relevant part 
of the BIA). 
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Software flaw in externally-hosted website 
 
 
 
 
 
All applications that an organization uses, internally or externally hosted, should be rated for their 
impact on the company’s objectives. The relevant risk that the organization can face in this situation 
is reputation risk. This type of risk does not have a direct link to the business processes and should 
be assessed at an organizational level. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Figure 7: Case study: IRAM, C4 part of BIA sheet. 
 
Software bug in SQL statement  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This vulnerability can be related to the business process, but can also be viewed as a separate 
regulatory risk category. Besides, the organization can face reputation risk. This type of risk does not 
have a direct link to the business processes and should be assessed at an organizational level. 
Regulatory bodies have established regulations for the use and storage of privacy information and 
(rather vague) requirements for automated systems. Legislation states that a business should take 
appropriate technical and organizational measures against unauthorized or unlawful processing of 
personal data, and against accidental loss or destruction of, or damage to, personal data. 
 
Definition of the example vulnerability: 
Externally hosted website includes a software flaw 
that makes it vulnerable 
for injection of images that compromise the 
organization 
The board members of the hypothetical organization stated in the company’s mission 
that they are against war and do not want to be involved with parties selling arms. 
Pressure groups who oppose war associate the company with insuring companies 
that sell arms. They hacked the website and used it as their publishing platform. The 
damage to the company’s reputation is rated as in Figure 7 (relevant part of BIA). 
Definition of the example vulnerability: 
Due to a software bug, the SQL statement to retrieve customer 
privacy data within a policy administration system can be 
misused to accomplish a dump of all the customer data within 
the customer relation system where the request is sent to. 
The board members of the hypothetical organization stated in the company’s mission that 
they will support their customers, regardless of the situation. This company-wide philosophy 
also has an effect on the way the company will handle the data of its customers. 
The board members have rated the impact of a breach of compliance with Data Privacy 
Legislation and Reputation Damage as “high” (Figure 8). 
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 Figure 8: Case study: [16] IRAM, O4 and C4 part of Excel sheet. 
 
However, before an impact can be assessed, it is first necessary to have a clear understanding of 
precisely which privacy data will be disclosed. It is also necessary to establish which information, 
when combined, constitutes privacy-related data.  
 
How a software flaw affects network exposure. 
 
 
 
 
 
The attack surface of the entire security infrastructure can be  
negatively impacted by a software design flaw. Software can be 
designed in such a way that it requires certain ports on servers to be 
opened in order to function properly. This can introduce vulnerabilities 
on the generic infrastructure level that will also affect other  
components (including “crown jewel” applications). 
This vulnerability is related to the technical context of the software. The developed software has to 
comply with the technological standards of the organization. The information technology 
infrastructure is designed as a layered environment with certain controls on different layers that, as 
a whole, ensure the security of the environment.  COBIT5 may be used for these processes. For 
example: 
 APO01.08: Maintain compliance with policies and procedures. Establish procedures to maintain 
compliance with, and performance measurement of, policies and other enablers of the control 
framework, and enforce the consequences of non-compliance or inadequate performance. 
Track trends and performance, and consider these in the future design and improvement of the 
control framework. One of the activities is: Analyze non-compliance and take appropriate 
action. 
Definition of the vulnerability: 
The software is developed in such a way that it requires some  
port within the firewall to be opened in order to function properly. 
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 DSS05.02: Manage network and connectivity security. Use security measures and related 
management procedures to protect information over all methods of connectivity.  
 
 
4 Resulting risk 
The risk of the example software vulnerabilities can be assessed using the model, the probability of 
the threat occurring, and the impact of the vulnerability. Based on the risk model, the assessed risk 
has been completed in the risk column of the table (Fig. 9). 
 
 Vulnerability Threat level Impact Risk 
1 Bug in software of the premium subsystem 2 High Low 
2 Software flaw in externally hosted website 10 High High 
3 Software bug in SQL statement 10 High High 
4 Software flaw effecting exposure of network 9 Medium Low 
The application is tested in the test environment using dummy interfaces. During 
installation on the production environment, the implementing team recognizes that certain 
required input does not reach the application. The developers inspect the production 
system and tell the implementers that a certain port on the firewall needs to be open.  
The people who implemented the infrastructure for the application are requested to open 
the port. They, however, inform the implementers that the installed firewall is operating 
according to the Operational Security Guidelines and do not want to open the port unless 
someone accepts the risk. The application owner is the only party willing to accept this risk. 
He has already paid millions of Euros for the application and wants it to work as soon as 
possible. 
 
The conclusion is that the application owner should not be able to accept this risk, even 
when he wants to accept it. He has a strong motivation not to follow the standard and 
lacks knowledge about the overall security environment. When he accepts this risk, he will 
only be attentive to the component that he understands, which is his business application 
environment. 
 
The impact of this kind of vulnerability should not be assessed by someone from the 
business, but by someone with the technical security knowledge of the comprehensive 
environment. Information for this kind of assessment cannot be gathered from a business 
impact assessment. It may require a technique such as Fault Tree Analysis to deduce what 
the “impact”  is on the overall security architecture. 
   
For the example, we assume that the impact of the vulnerability is rated as “medium”. 
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 Figure 9: Case study: Risk evaluation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Figure 10: Case study: 5x5 matrix 
 
Based on this model, we can now show the business manager the effect of the software 
vulnerabilities on the risk profile of the organization. 
 
 
 
Conclusion 
Software vulnerabilities will be an issue in the coming decades since much software is developed 
without taking security into account. Besides this, as millions and millions lines of codes are written, 
the occurrence of faults having security exposure is inevitable. Knowing this, the need for some 
method to distinguish between software vulnerabilities based on the level of business risk will 
become more and more desirable. Scarce resources can only be invested once. 
Security assessments and audits of software have to be extended. Nowadays assessment stops in 
general when vulnerabilities are presented in a rather technical language with some severity rating. 
Software vulnerabilities have to be presented in a language that clarifies which vulnerabilities can 
have the highest negative impact on business goals. This enables a business manager to make an 
informed decision about which vulnerabilities have to be mitigated first. 
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